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MINUTES OF THE IAC MEETING - 21 JULY 1950

DIRECTOR: I would like to take up first today the letter, which all of you, I trust, have received - the Department of the Air Force request for reports on the [REDACTED] now held by [REDACTED] incom- 25X1C municado and I think Mr. Howe is in the best position to answer that.

MR. HOWE: I was a little taken aback by the four signatures on the document. Upon looking into it we found we had sent out two or three days ago, in response to an agreed decision by the Scientific Committee, urging that they consider the matter and urging that they go along with the position which the Services, in this case, wanted. Telegrams were sent out. We were a little reluctant to order [REDACTED] 25X1C to do something until we see whether he has any kind of a position on it, but we have, ourselves, no objection to the position and we had already taken steps to see that it was put in shape.

DIRECTOR: Any answer back?

MR. HOWE: No, not up until the time I left.

ADM. JOHNSON: Is it a matter of ethics on the part of the custodians?

DIRECTOR: No, not purely ethics. They probably promulgated a semi law. Whether it is semi law or ethics I don't think it is explicit in either case. I certainly agree that we ought to get the dope and I think that if the position is only ethics, we had better forget ethics, and if it is a law, since it is not a statute passed by Congress but something [REDACTED] started, we had better get it abrogated or changed, for I do think we need the things. I don't think there is any real objection from anybody here in this country. The only thing is how do we go about it? Have the Secretary of Defense address the Secretary of State, or do we want the IAC to do it? I should think the first approach should be done first.

ADM. JOHNSON: Don't you think there is a possibility of it being resolved by these two dispatches?

MR. HOWE: I didn't realize there was an issue involved and it has been taking its normal course since the scientific committees's

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decision and the telegraphs went out following that. So as far as I am concerned it looks like it is being taken care of. But we will go to bat on it if [REDACTED] responds in a contrary fashion.

GEN. CABELL: I understand there is a controversy going on between the local intelligence agencies and it just ~~finally~~ finally got out of the local baliwick. I am not saying at all the approach being made so far will result in any improvement. I feel that [REDACTED] is dug 25X1C in and is dealing from very strong convictions.

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MR. HOWE: We, at least the State Department, has never before applied itself to the problem to the extent of sending telegrams out, because it had not been raised as an issue. We will immediately do something about it if we run into obstacles, but we will have to wait to see what comes back from [REDACTED] against the position that has been existing. I don't anticipate any difficulty. The only basis I see for objection, aside from any moral position, is the question of patents and I am going on the assumption, I am sure is right, there is no question of exposure of this material to commercial concerns.

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[REDACTED]

GEN. CABELL: But he seems to be concinced that he can't subject himself to any position.

MR. HOWE: Well, my feeling is that it would be premature to take further steps until we get a response. We, in the State Department, are certainly not resisting this move. It is the first time it has come to us as an issue that needs this kind of treatment.

DIRECTOR: Have you got anything Dr. Colby?

DR. COLBY: Nothing substantive, but I have a feeling about this. I don't believe there is very much there, but I don't know whether that matters to the operation at all. I have the feeling that these controls have not been very well carried out. There is, as far as I can find out, not much in the way of inspection. The [REDACTED] have been as 25X1C

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to submit these, but ~~we~~ have not been cooperative. There has not been much endeavor to check up on them. Anyway I think it is embarrassing to them to have it revealed. I understand the housekeeping in this office is very poor and there is no response to letters, so I am not at all sure there is much there.

DIRECTOR: That may explain their reluctance.

DR. COLBY: That is my hunch on the matter, that there isn't any.

ADM. JOHNSON: Has [REDACTED] taken a position on it?

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MR. TRUEHEART: There is a letter there that he wrote to [REDACTED] outlining the agreement that [REDACTED] made. Shute wrote a letter to Nordstrom in March outlining various things that had been agreed ~~on~~ between [REDACTED] and himself, that should be turned over, but not these statutory reports. [REDACTED]

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DIRECTOR: If there is no objection we will put this over until State gets a reply to their messages and you send it over here and we will distribute it over here, and depending on that reply we may not have to do anything.

GEN. CABELL: I agree that it is the consensus of the Board, the IAC, that this is a desirable action to accomplish this.

DIRECTOR: I think we can certainly do that. If we know there is nothing there you still have the idea there is a lot there and it is a gold mine.

DR. COLBY: I agree it should be seen whether there is anything there or not.

DIRECTOR: The next item then is the letter submitted by the Air Force on priorities. Would you like to start, Pearre, with that?

GEN. CABELL: Our idea in turning this in was we started it in the JIC some time ago and it resulted in putting down on paper a statement of our basic intelligence objectives in an order of priority, which we think is useful to the JIC Members, and it seemed at the same time logical and desirable that if such a list would be available to the JIC that an IAC-wide list would also be useful, and we don't know whether it is practical to determine such a list of objectives or not, but certainly it would be useful if we do get it and I for one appreciate the response

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of State to this and I think the proposals which they suggest

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~~proposal~~ is how to go about determining the usefulness of this idea is very appropriate and I would like to agree with their proposal.

DIRECTOR: I, speaking for ~~me~~ ourselves, agree that the State proposal is very good. I think first it is not necessary to go to the NSC to say what priorities are because I don't think they can give them ~~and~~ to you. We can give it ourselves. It is not necessary to go to them and then I doubt if you can get a straight list of priorities that everyone will agree to. You can put them in classes. For instance, the Air Force top priority should be your No. 2, Capabilities of their Strategic Air Power (USSR), and should have ~~that~~ absolute priority. Of this you might get a lot of objections from the Navy. They want to know about a submarine attack and the Army a ground attack. They are more or less in a classification. These would all be top priority without any relative calss between them. Maybe we can get a committee to work on them.

ADM. JOHNSON: We have already reached an agreement. It is just the integration of the civilian objectives of the other agencies into or above this. I agree with Admiral Hillenkoetter, I don't see why there should have to be an NSC Directive but an IAC operating procedure or something like that that we could amend ourselves.

GEN. CABELL: I hold no brief as to the form that list should be published in at all.

MR. CHILDS: Is that just information for our collectors and your own attaches?

GEN. CABELL: It is far more than a collection guide, it is a production guide also.

MR. CHILDS: Yes, both of them.

MR. HOWE: I think it is extreme;y importnat and it would be worth the difficulties of trying to get it too.

DIRECTOR: We have the military list. You send a list and if it is agreeable, you all have this State letter, we will follow out as they say in the last paragraph and see if we can get the thing up.

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MR. HOWE: Do you think it would pay to have a group sit down and try to work them out?

DIRECTOR: Either way.

MR. HOWE: I also think it is important to weigh any such list against the capabilities for collection and that we are almost in a vacuum when we list objectives at the breadth of these, and ^{then} these are political, and would have to be, to put down the objective withxxx respect to intentions generally. It is almost so broad as to be flat, unless we look at it in the terms of capability of collection. I would like to say - a bunch of heads trying to articulate and the collectinn people sitting down looking at this in terms of their capability and come up with a program. We think this is the best collection program and with the objectives you state and we can signify the kind of thing we want rather than the very broad objective. In other words, I would encourage doing it on a working group basis rather than sending memoranda back and forth.

GEN. CABELL: That is an appropriate matter for the Standing Committee of the IAC to address itself to.

DIRECTOR: Certainly. If there is no disagreement, give it top priority, give them a priority to determine priorities.

ADM. JOHNSON: I think the thing which is not on here, but should be is "what are the Soviets going to do?"

GEN. MEGEE: Yes, going to do day after tommorrow at six o'clock.

ADM. JOHNSON: But there is no capability to know.

MR. HOWE: We ought to have the working group look at it. It is not ~~xxx~~ black and white, there is a great deal of actions which may be indicative and help us toward the intentions. It won't be black and white.

GEN. CABELL: Regardless, we are not very hopeful of our capabilities. It should head the list. I think I would have put it at

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the head of the list here.

DIRECTOR: We ought to tell them to send word over to Mr. Stalin that it is not fair changing after he makes up his mind on a Sunday afternoon. That throws us off.

GEN. MEGEE: We evaluate his intentions and he changes his mind. We would all be investigated.

DIRECTOR: The report made in USCIB is not anything classfied, but the USCIB sent up a memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, and Mr. Lay asked me today, and I told him Earl Stone put in some file too, so he wants to get any recommendations on that. We had better see about that money and personnel.

25X1C ADM. JOHNSON: Doesn't that cross the thing we were talking about day before yesterday at the [REDACTED] meeting? We are supporting Earl Stones's request to JCS for additional men, money, officers, and civilians so it seems to be that is on the beam too. It might add some statute to it if everyone here voted to consider it.

GEN. IRWIN: I don't think we can, I can give you what I want in money, people, and everything else. We have already put it in, but I think the statement to the NSC that we consider the NSC should direct intelligence to advance to a state of pre-mobilization, which is enough without going into it. You will find that each Service has its own problems and as Felix said if he soups his up we have to soup ours up.

DIRECTOR: Well you draw up what you think is a general statement like that?

GEN. IRWIN: If you let me circulate it to the members.

DIRECTOR: The general letter is signed by Park Armstrong, but they have to have something specific. We took his letter and said it is going to be approved, but they didn't want the number of personnel and the amount of money.

MR. HOWE: What is Stone's letter asking for?

GEN. IRWIN: He is getting a material increase in [REDACTED] and asking 25X1C for it, he got it down to cases.

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DIRECTOR: He is very explicit - so many people, so many dollars, so many months, and where he is going to use them. The Security Council will support it, but they want to know the details.

GEN. IRWIN: I think they got mixed up as a Defense matter in the NSC, but we felt if the NSC, at that level, directs the Secretaries that it has to be increased, that intelligence needs the boost, mine does, it will help keep him convinced. We direct our people who have intelligence agencies to consider this as a critical situation. They should be accorded at least a pre-mobilization statement.

MR. HOWE: I was not at the USCIB meeting, but what I did understand is that it was agreed that there was first to be a general statement, resolution, going in from USCIB on USCIB matters and presumably the IAC would want to get in a parallel statement to take care of the same principles that apply to non-USCIB matters and that in point of fact the specific program.

GEN. IRWIN: That specific program as far as AFSA is concerned is favorable and if the Joint Chiefs approve it -

GEN. CABELL: No USCIB action is called for/

GEN. IRWIN: But urged its members, in effect that is one member, Earl Stone, that the other members exploit what Earl has already done.

ADM. JOHNSON: A directive or recognition of the project from NSC would be useful.

DIRECTOR: To see that none of the boys would be dragging their feet.

GEN. CABELL: A pre-mobilization would be a partial mobilization.

ADM. JOHNSON: To the point where they can sufficiently process all the material that is augmented by AFSA.

GEN. IRWIN: Intelligence augmented in funds and personnel will permit it to cope with this situation of world tension.

MR. HOWE: The NSC 68 is a good reference point that even called for an increase of intelligence activities in general. It is a natural

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followup on that that this should go in.

GEN. IRWIN: Everybody ~~has~~ has told us to do better. With more people we can actually step the action up. My increase was big to start with. It has been approved even through General McNaughton and he didn't say a peep - ~~300~~ 300 people have been approved practically up to the Secretary of Defense. Of course, the budget people will get a crack at it.

DIRECTOR: In the procedure how would you suggest we go about drawing up ~~it~~ this general statement for approval by the ~~Security~~ Security Council?

GEN. IRWIN: I think a copy was sent to you. The IAC could take cognizance of it and the second thing is a forollary to the above. The other intelligence activities should receive similar increases.

GEN. IRWIN: Could you have the working committee do it?

DIRECTOR: We will draw it up and send it around and if it is acceptable we will pop it in before the next meeting.

MR. HOWE: I was a little concerned following the resolution of USCIB. The President issued his statement permitting or ~~authorizing~~ authorizing collective mobilization and similarly the Defense Department was authorized to make an expansion. State Department would welcome a boost that its intelligence is also in need of this kind of thing. What is to be gained, except recognition?

DIRECTOR: What you will do is stop some of these boys chisling all the money away and not giving any to intelligence. The USCIB thing was started before the President made his statement.

MR. HOWE: Will the NSC call for a program from each of the member agencies comparable to what they called for from USCIB - a one page recommendation?

DIRECTOR: I think the USCIB memorandum, it will more or less accept the thing. They will think USCIB has done our work on it for us. I think that will work.

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GEN. IRWIN: We still have no idea how the Secretary of Defense is going to react to this material increase in our intelligence.

DIRECTOR: I don't ~~km~~ think this one will need documentation. It might not do so much good, but it won't hurt anything.

GEN. IRWIN: How ~~about~~ about you Dr. Colby, don't you need anything

DR. COLBY: Of course, we are not a collecting agency. In research and integration we certainly could do with more. We hoped to provide you with more material.

MR. HOWE: I wonder if in this question whether the plans for calling up of reserves have been sufficiently firm so we can have any idea in the State Department and intelligence whether some of our key people are threatened by a callup. Do you have any information on that?

GEN. IRWIN: I talked to G-1 today of how they were approaching it and they said they were going to start on the voluntary system, which I don't like, and they said at the end of the week the ~~the~~ volunteers will fail them because people are not going to give their jobs up when they know they are going to have to be alternated and I told G-1 I would not order anyone in on that basis of induction that would hurt another intelligence agency.

GEN. MEGEE: Do you have any who are Marine Officers? If you have, he will be getting his sailing orders if he is in the Washington Battalion. Even the key men in your organization ^{are} is going to get his orders.

ADM. JOHNSON: Our roll is that you must take them from the ~~the~~ organized reserve unless you can promise you can't find anything in the organized reserve mobilization. As far as filling up our office we are taking the ~~the~~ people who have been slated for that particular billet in ONI from the organized reserve. We have from 14 to 1500 before we start to work on the volunteer reserve.

DIRECTOR: I think General Irwin has the idea - if he is ordered in he gets a claim on his job. If he volunteers, he gets no claim.

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MR. HOWE: There are a number of key people in our Department, intelligence and otherwise who have kept up a very active interest and participation in the reserve and ~~we~~ are still in intelligence and would be the most useful, but at the same time is very useful to us. Is the actual selection up to the various services or is it in the hands of either a central defense spot or is it up to General Hershey?

GEN. MEGEE: I imagine it is up to every service, but we are going it better.

ADM. JOHNSON: I just lost five out of my own office. The net gain is minus three. The Severn Naval Command has ordered up five of my analysts for yeomen.

GEN. CABELL: I am like you, we want to avoid robbing Peter to pay Paul.

GEN. IRWIN: If we did the voluntary is liable to step out and we wouldn't be ~~rob~~ robbing you.

GEN. MEGEE: If he is a member below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel he already has been ordered to duty; if he is a volunteer reserve, he has not been called.

DIRECTOR: We made arrangements with each of the services and General Hershey before anyone was drafted from here they would be referred back here to see if we want to let them go.

MR. HOWE: State has taken similar steps.

DIRECTOR: It is a shame to send out your good crack people as yeomen.

ADM. JOHNSON: We are fighting it, but there is no resolution yet.

GEN. MEGEE: It has to be referred to the Secretary of Defense and if you want to take any exceptions they are on their way, they already have a reporting date.

DIRECTOR: Anything else? Incidentally, for a bit of information, the Joint Atomic Affairs Committee said that the report we sent them is the best report that has been submitted to them since they have been in existence.

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